MISPRISION OF TREASON
In recent weeks, Uganda has witnessed a controversial legal and political development involving prominent lawyer and former Kampala Lord Mayor, Erias Lukwago. Lukwago, who is well known for his human rights advocacy and opposition politics, was arrested and charged with misprision of treason, an offence relating to the failure to report knowledge of treason to the authorities.
The case has generated widespread public debate, with supporters describing the charges as politically motivated, while others argue that the law should apply equally to all citizens. The matter has also reignited discussions on the meaning of misprision of treason, the rights of accused persons, and the role of lawyers in representing clients accused of serious offences against the State.
In simple terms, a person commits the offence of misprision of treason when he or she has knowledge of treason and deliberately keeps silent instead of informing the government or law enforcement authorities, as provided for under Section 25 of the Penal Code Act, Cap. 128.
The offence is intended to protect the security of the State by requiring citizens to report acts that threaten the government, such as attempts to overthrow it, wage war against the State, or assist the country’s enemies.
The essential elements of the offence are:
- The accused had knowledge that treason had been planned, committed, or was being committed;
- The accused failed to disclose that information to the proper authorities, and
- The failure to report was intentional.
Under Ugandan law, misprision of treason is recognised as a serious offence because treason itself is considered one of the gravest crimes against the State. Therefore, anyone who knowingly conceals information relating to treason may be held criminally liable even if they did not directly participate in the alleged treasonous acts.
In the case of former Kampala Lord Mayor Erias Lukwago, who also serves as counsel for Dr. Kizza Besigye, who is alleged to have committed treason, the allegation against Lukwago is that he had knowledge of his client’s alleged plans to commit treason but failed to communicate that information to the State for purposes of national security.
However, this raises important questions regarding advocate-client confidentiality. Under the Evidence Act, Sections 124, 125, and 126 prohibit advocates from disclosing any communication made to them in the course of their professional employment or the contents of any documents with which they have become acquainted, unless the client gives express consent.
Similarly, Regulation 7 of the Advocates (Professional Conduct) Regulations imposes an ethical duty of confidentiality upon advocates and prohibits them from revealing information obtained while representing a client unless disclosure is required by law or expressly authorised by the client.
Additionally, the principle of confidentiality is supported by Article 27 of the Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, which guarantees the right to privacy, including the privacy of personal communications.
The case involving Erias Lukwago has brought the offence of misprision of treason into the public spotlight and sparked important discussions concerning justice, national security, and the rule of law in Uganda. Regardless of the outcome of the case, it serves as a reminder that allegations of serious offences must be handled in accordance with the Constitution and the principles of a fair trial.
It also highlights the need for the public to understand the law, the rights of accused persons, and the importance of allowing courts to determine guilt or innocence based on the evidence presented before them.
Ultimately, the case underscores the delicate balance between protecting State security and safeguarding individual rights and freedoms in a democratic society.
